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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. LIII, NO. 24: NOVEMBER 22, 1956

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PUBLISHED FORTNIGHTLY
BY THE
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, INC.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

FOUNDED BY FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE AND WENDELL T. BUSH

EDITORS: Herbert W. Schneider, John H. Randall, Jr., Ernest Nagel.

MANAGING EDITOR: Emerson Buchanan.

Communications to the editors should be addressed to the Managing Editor, 713 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y. Subscriptions and advertisements should be sent to THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 713 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y. The annual subscription price (twenty-six numbers) is $5.25. The price of single numbers is 35 cents, double numbers, 60 cents.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY is owned by the Journal of Philosophy, Inc., and published fortnightly at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pa. Editorial Office: 713 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y. President, Albert G. Redpath; Vice President, John H. Randall, Jr.; Treasurer, Frederick A. Dewey; Secretary, Ernest Nagel.

Entered as second class matter, March 18, 1921, at the Post Office at Lancaster, Pa., under Act of Congress of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in paragraph (d-2), section 34.40, P. L. & R. of 1948, authorized March 11, 1952.

PUBLICATIONS

FOR SALE AT

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY INC.

515 W. 116th STREET NEW YORK 27, N. Y.

A Bibliography of Philosophy, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936. 4 issues, 56 pages each. (Double numbers of THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY.) $1.00 each issue, $2.75 for the four issues.

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VOLUME LIII, No. 24 NOVEMBER 22, 1956

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

SANTAYANA AND THE POETIC FUNCTION OF RELIGION

I

GEORGE Santayana's views on religion have been either almost wholly neglected or severely castigated by contemporary religionists and theologians as well as by liberal philosophers of religion. This is interesting and significant in regard to attitudes prevalent towards religion in the world today. For Santayana emphasized consistently what seem to be the most obvious elements of religion, and in some degree participated in the current concern with the symbolic transformations that occur in religion no less than in science and art—a concern, however, that has frankly penetrated only the most exceptional churches and theological seminaries. The attitudes towards Santayana are indicative of the extreme positions that characterize two very influential groups in modern thought: on the one hand, many theological groups, led by competent and sincere men convinced that tradition has much to teach the present, are undergoing a revival of orthodoxy, of fundamentalism, though perhaps with a difference; on the other hand, a great many of the most effective and eloquent of current thinkers are insisting that true morality and spirituality demand a complete break with traditional religions. Santayana could not really sympathize or identify himself with either of these groups or attitudes. Ambivalent as it may seem, he was convinced that the moral—ethical and spiritual—effectiveness of religion depends, for the great majority, on the acceptance of the literal truth of its poetry, myth, and allegory, but that scientifically religion is as irrelevant to the truth as the fairy tales that delight imaginative children.

This conclusion, that religion is literally impertinent to scientific fact, has been enough to persuade a great many men, philosophers and non-philosophers, of the worthlessness of religion. But not so for Santayana. Sophisticated and wise as he was, he remained sufficiently imaginative to delight in perspectives which he accepted as fictions and which other people defended the truth of with pen and sword, or denounced as detrimental to balanced living. That

Santayana had and nurtured this imaginative dimension led to the accusation that he shunned moral responsibliity and came to philosophy as to a game or sport where the playing is all that counts. This facility of his imagination in accommodating itself to the poetic value of diverse schemes resulted in the judgment by a Catholic critic—a judgment shared by many Protestants and humanists—that "Santayana was neither great nor profound as a philosopher . . . . He does not even deserve the title of philosopher, if by common agreement the etymological meaning of the word is accepted. Santayana was not a lover of wisdom. He was an essentialist *par excellence,* and, as M. Gilson has noted, 'The awareness of existence is the beginning of philosophical wisdom.' Santayana never got started in philosophy. He was utterly, and preferably, detached from existential reality, and from truth which is but a mental embrace of it. His basic difficulty was that he could not distinguish between reason and imagination, thought and fancy, poetry and philosophy."[1]

Most commentators on Santayana's religious philosophy have simply elaborated the substance of one of the reviews of his earliest writing on religion, *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion,* which was published in 1900. In *The Amercian Journal of Theology,* William C. Wilkinson expressed uncompromising disapproval of the "fanciful and sterile character of the 'idea' that the author has thought it worthwhile to inculcate," and affirmed that religion is not essentially poetic but "consists besides in commonplace everyday behavior conformed to the will of God."[2] Those who would not dare speak with similar assurance in regard to the will of God have not been unenthusiastic in their agreement that Santayana renders religion sterile and ineffective. Santayana's declaration, "Another world to live in—whether we expect ever to pass wholly into it or no—is what we mean by having a religion," made religion a worthless if not vicious escape to the non-religious moralists and an insubstantial imaginative experience to the orthodox believer. Consequently, Santayana was attacked with vehemence from all sides—by William James and Royce no less than by the fundamentalists. There is some justification of Santayana's own point of view, however, and an appropriate criticism of one wing of his critics when he goes on to observe that the attitude of those "who plume themselves on detecting the scientific ineptitude of religion—

[1] Richard Butler, "Memories of Santayana," *The Commonweal,* October 24, 1952, p. 58.

[2] William C. Wilkinson, review of *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, The American Journal of Theology,* Vol. 4, p. 887.

[3] George Santayana, *Reason in Religion* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905), p. 6.

something which the blindest half see—is not nearly enlightened enough: it points to notorious facts incompatible with religious tenets literally taken, but it leaves unexplored *the habits of thought from which those tenets spring, their original meaning, and their true function.* Such studies would bring the sceptic face to face with the mystery and pathos of mortal existence. They would make him understand why religion is so profoundly moving and in a sense so profoundly just."[4] The absence of such appreciation is no doubt the basis of much disparagement of religions, and the chief justification of many well-intentioned but ill-timed and ill-informed efforts at correction. Yet Santayana himself by no means developed consistently the most profound implications of religious actions, symbols, and beliefs.

II

Santayana conceived of religion, no matter what its particular character, as generated by the relation of a specific human psyche to its environment. Experience, he suggests, cannot prove the existence of God, but that "does not indicate that human experience affords no avenue to *the idea of God*—for history proves the contrary. . . ."[5] Whatever ideas, ideals, or figments may be expressed in religion—and poetry—are thoroughly human and must be understood in terms of their genesis and function, even if they cannot be accepted as indicative of the nature of the universe outside man's experience. To the student of the human situation the values of religion do not disappear when their scientific falsity is made evident. Indeed, such values are most evident to the critic who can see them detached and free of the commitments which a specific religion demands. For then, "He sees that they are expressions of human genius; that however false to their subject-matter they may be, like the conventions of art they are true to the eye and to the spirit that fashioned them. And as nothing in the world, not even the truth, is so interesting as human genius, these incredible or obsolete religions and philosophies become delightful to us. The sting is gone out of their errors, which no longer threaten to delude us, and they have acquired a beauty invisible to the eye of their authors, because of the very refraction which the truth suffered in that vital medium."[6]

The life of religion, as Santayana sees it, then, is the life of its symbols and ideals as vital and meaningful parts of a culture.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[5] George Santayana, *Reason in Common Sense* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905), p. 122. Italics not in the original.

[6] George Santayana, *Egotism in German Philosophy* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916), pp. 154–155.

Religion without suitable symbolic expression is no religion at all. "The liberal school that attempts to fortify religion by minimizing its expression, both theoretic and devotional, seems to be merely impoverishing religious symbols and vulgarizing religious aims; it subtracts from faith that imagination by which faith becomes an interpretation and idealization of human life, and retains only a stark and superfluous principle of superstition."[7] Religion, like poetry, is not so much a way of life as an expression and enhancement of the values of living: it is expression in appropriate terms of the debt one owes to the powers and conditions that have created and which sustain him (piety), of the ideals towards which he aspires (spirituality), all conditioned by the recognition of the fundamental rights of all other creatures (charity). This expression, when vital, is spontaneous and imaginative. The bare facts and the disconnected details of life are highly insufficient; for the mind of man is more than a means to nutriment and the satisfaction of the passions: "The best and keenest part of it consists in that very gift of creation and government which, together with all the transcendental functions of his own mind, man has significantly attributed to God as to his highest ideal. Not to see in this activity the purpose and standard of all life is to have left human nature half unread."[8] To devote all one's attention to the observation of "facts," to the convulsions of the surrounding world, is to impoverish life unnecessarily. "The environing world can justify itself to the mind only by the free life which it fosters there."[9]

The function of prayer, as described by Santayana, indicates the imaginative and poetic character of religion generally. In *Reason in Religion* Santayana suggests that the function of prayer is threefold: first, in what is perhaps its most truly poetic function, prayer expresses or defines the ideal toward which the individual soul aspires; second, prayer enables the soul, through the very act of expression, to grow more like the ideal that is expressed; and third, prayer reconciles the soul to the alien and inevitable circumstances —existence, finitude, and all concomitant limitations—in which it finds itself involved. These functions are, moreover, vital parts of the life of reason, insofar as reason is called "the art of satisfying our compatible inclinations in the midst of our inevitable circumstances."[10] But of particular interest here is the fact that these same functions may be discriminated no less clearly in so-called

[7] L. P. Smith, *Little Essays Drawn From the Writings of George Santayana* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), p. 52.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[10] George Santayana, *Dominations and Powers* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 159.

secular poetry, especially in the poetry of the Greeks. Indeed, if a synthesis of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophies of poetry is allowed to be indicative of the nature of Greek poetry, Santayana's analysis of prayer bears striking resemblance to the poetic expression of that ancient people. Plato's writings are themselves eloquent justification of the idea that poetry enables man to define and express his ideals, and of all philosophers, perhaps, he was most convinced of the power of the ideal to make man's soul more like itself. And surely there is nowhere a more complete or convincing demonstration of poetry's power of reconciliation than Aristotle's analysis of Greek tragedy. Santayana finds these elements, aspiration and reconciliation, along with charity, the essential elements not only of prayer but of religion itself. The act of expression is the essential spiritual fulfillment. The expression of prayer is not "for the preposterous purpose of changing the will of God, or causing nature to revise the contingency of things, which seen from within is freedom and seen from above is fate. It flows out spontaneously from the fullness of the heart, in confession, in reflection, in prophetic vistas, in resigned and transmuting union with the truth and with a different infinite Good at first hidden from the eyes." So, "rational prayer is not a means but an end." In rational prayer, "we are recollecting, digesting, purifying our conscience. Essentially, we are addressing nobody; the names and forms of the gods are as mutable as our necessities." Therefore, it is no paradox that "among us now there are good people who pray that there may be a God to pray to."[11]

It is poetry, then, or expressive creativity, and not the specific beliefs or patterns of a religion, that is native to man; it is the expression and not the petition that is the vital element wherever prayer is appropriate and truly spiritual. "We cannot help being poets; but we may make our poetry better, more harmonious in itself and more exactly symbolic of our relations to all that attracts and to all that controls us."[12] But harmony, or consistency (or one religion for all times and all peoples), is actually undesirable so far as the total volume of prayer or poetry is concerned. Contradiction is both inevitable and congenial to the functions of poetry—and prayer. Life is so rich and varied that "It is impossible for inspired language to say everything at once, or for strong feeling to feel everything equally. At best, after venting one emotion we may recall another, and so qualify the issue; but the inspiration,

[11] George Santayana, *Realms of Being* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), pp. 798–800.

[12] George Santayana, *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 177.

if it is genuine, must remain in each case specific and vital."[13] Religions must be as diverse and unique as poems, and even then a great deal of significant experience will never be adequately symbolized and shared.

Santayana is much more impressed, obviously, by the activity and value of the imagination—a free, untrammeled imagination—than are most philosophers and theologians. It is supposed quite generally that a too active imagination is the source of superstition and madness, and that the wise man is one who gives attention to his objective observations and keeps strict control over the suggestions of the spontaneous and creative faculties. (This was the attitude that John Dewey intellectualized in his philosophy of art.) For the most part contemporary thinkers would not agree that "It is not wisdom to be only wise, And on the inward vision close the eyes."[14] Preference is given to the so-called objective world; or at least the "inward vision" is counted as of little importance philosophically. To keep the eyes directed outwards is the way to be truly wise and to avoid the dangers of superstitution. But, Santayana suggests, "Men become superstitious, not because they have too much imagination, but because they are not aware that they have any; and even the best philosophers seldom perceive the poetic merit of their systems."[15]

It is the highly imaginative side of religion that is emphasized by Santayana; and there is little doubt that it was this emphasis that brought down on him the wrath of priests and prophets and encouraged the scorn of many moralists and literal-minded reformers. And perhaps such wrath and scorn are not altogether unjustified. There is certainly much to be said for the idea that any religion worthy of man will consciously attempt to make the world better by the application of human intelligence instead of merely seeking "another world to live in." In some sense, surely, nothing less than a bold and confident approach to the problems of immediate and obvious importance is justified. Yet, Santayana says, apparently with some truth and in praise of Christianity, that, "It never was a religion for the rationalist and worlding; it was based on alienation from the world, from the intellectual world no less than from the economic and political. It flourished in the Oriental imagination that is able to treat all existence with disdain and to hold it superbly at arm's length, and at the same time is subject to visions and false memories, is swayed by the eloquence

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

[14] *The Philosophy of Santayana*, ed. by Irwin Edman (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 21.

[15] George Santayana, *Reason in Religion*, p. 24.

of private passion, and raises confidently to heaven the cry of the poor, the bereaved, and the distressed. Its daily bread, from the beginning, was hope for a miraculous change of scene, for prison walls falling to the ground about it, for a heart inwardly comforted, and a shower of good things from the sky."[16] Consequently, to the Christian reformer Santayana offers nothing but discouragement by suggesting that the Christian ideal can never be the guide of the secular and social life of man. This, he would have us believe, is a judgment justified by history, "since the ages of faith, the ages of Christian unity, were such only superficially." In the most Christian of the centuries, the thirteenth, "Christendom . . . was by no means a kingdom of God on earth; it was a conglomeration of incorrigible rascals, intellectually more or less Christian."[17] In effect Santayana actually suggests that, if a religion is to remain vital and significant, it must supervene rather than intervene in life in any efficacious sense. Religion is not really "poetry become the guide of life,"[18] except in a very poetic sense. For, "An anti-worldly religion finds itself in fact in this dilemma: if it remains merely spiritual, developing no material organs, it cannot affect the world; while if it develops organs with which to operate on the world, these organs become a part of the world from which it is trying to wean the individual spirit, so that the moment it is armed for conflict such a religion has two enemies on its hands. It is stifled by its necessary armour, and adds treason in its members to hostility in its foes. The passions and arts it uses against its opponents are as fatal to itself as those which its opponents array against it."[19] Surely it is little wonder that many modern religious liberals, who find the justification of religion in its attention to social melioration, no less than orthodox Christians, have been unsympathetic to Santayana's religious philosophy. If religion "offers another world, almost as vast and solid as the real one, in which the soul may develop," then what need is there to reform the actual world nearer the soul's demand? Such religion is of minimum value in a society concerned to have the soul content at home.

But Santayana goes even further. He suggests, contrary to the mood of everything the most influential religions have suggested, that "what is false in the science of facts may be true in

[16] George Santayana, *Winds of Doctrine* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), p. 35.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[18] George Santayana, *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900), p. 289.

[19] George Santayana, *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 37.

the science of values."[20] Such an admission is also of particular interest in a naturalistic philosophy, where values are generally conceived as wholly dependent upon and compatible with the facts of nature, which when discovered become the facts of science. In some sense it seems a denial of the essential core of naturalism, as well as of most religious philosophies, to assert that the realm of values is utterly different from the world of facts. A little reflection in terms of his total philosophy reveals, however, that such denial is far from the intention of Santayana. He is only suggesting that the stubborness and limitations of matter (which he considers the matrix of all that is) are such that the ideal possibilities suggested by what is actual can never be realized existentially. Nature creates and sustains ideals as events in the minds of her creatures, but these cannot be actualized in any other mode. At best they are celebrated in religion and poetry. The bodily and material organization of man, properly protected and nourished, gives birth to spirit—the faculty of detached observation of the passing and varigated manifestations of matter and the capacity of creating and living in the presence of the ideal. The value of life, as Santayana sees it, is ideally complete only when spirit performs its functions without interruption and hindrance. The science of facts indicates only the material foundations and conditions of the psyche necessary to the development of spirit; such values are essentially negative. The science of value, on the other hand, is concerned with the positive perfections that may suggest themselves to a psyche that has already settled its accounts with the world and made its material conditions as secure as possible. It is a vision of these perfections that religions cultivate.

III

A certain ambivalence has already been noted in Santayana's religious thought. He felt the worth of religion and art as few men have; yet his metaphysics would allow them no more than a passing and phenomenal significance. The life of the spirit he considered the only redeeming element in an existence otherwise hateful and vain; yet spirit is ephemeral and not truly indicative of anything substantial or enduring in nature. Another aspect of this ambivalence is perhaps most evident in the essay, "Modernism and Christianity," which is by no means an attack on the intents of modernism, or on a liberal and symbolic interpretation of Christian literature, though read superficially it might seem to be such. It is rather a plea that such interpretations profess their apostasy and take their stand in the marketplace, leaving such matters as

[20] George Santayana, *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, p. 91.

creeds, sin and salvation, heaven and hell to those who are believers in the most literal sense. The modernists, he notes, "wish to preserve the continuity of moral traditions; they wish the poetry of life to flow down to them uninterruptedly and copiously from all the ages. It is a wise and amiable desire." But it should be recognized, he suggests, that their attitude is worldly rather than Christian. Indeed, the modernists are "men of the Renaissance, pagan and pantheistic in their profounder sentiment." But this criticism of the modernists is not meant to suggest that Christianity is at all superior to either paganism or other religions. In fact, Santayana says, "the pagan Greeks, the Buddhists, and Mohammedans would have much to say for themselves before the impartial tribunal of human nature and reason."[21] The modernists, the liberals, even the anti-clericals are honest, and in a measure wise, but their perceptions and sympathies do not go deep enough. "They think the weakness of the church lies in its not following the inspiration of the age." The inspiration of the age is apparently science, higher criticism, and symbolism; these render it impossible for many to believe that the virgin birth, the resurrection, and the miracles were actual historical events. However, the modernists are wrong in suggesting that all men should accept these conclusions; for "it would be stupid to assume that what is incredible to you or me now must always be incredible to mankind. What was foolishness to the Greeks of St. Paul's day spread mightily among them one or two hundred years later; and what is foolishness to the modernist today may edify future generations."[22] The modernist, Santayana suggests, who insists that no one should find more than a symbolic significance in Christianity is a profound student neither of religion nor of human nature.

But neither is this meant to contradict the view that religion at its best is distinguished from magic or superstition largely by the fact that superstition attempts to control the world—attempts to intervene,—while religion, at least when it is most spiritual, accepts the world and transcends it. Religion is characterized by escape from the world through the spiritual power of transcending it. "Thy will be done" is more truly religious than "Give us this day our daily bread." Thus, "The salvation worked by the cross is worked by it essentially, intrinsically, spiritually, not by accident or legal artifice or in the interests of the world itself. It is salvation out of the world, not by a change in the world (though some change will incidentally occur in it) but by a change of allegiance in the heart, so that the interests of the world will count

[21] George Santayana, *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 54.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 54–55.

for less and less in the heart, and the interests of the spirit for more and more."[23] So the highest poetry and the best religion supervene on life and render life richer, broader, happier; they do not intervene in life, except incidentally, to make life safer or surer or more prosperous. Indeed, Santayana suggests, there is nothing spiritual about the hope for a home in heaven.

Essentially, then, poetry and religion are identical in function. Such is Santayana's reasoned judgment, in spite of the fact that he suggests in "Modernism and Christianity" that those who believe literally in the deluge, the resurrection, and the sacraments constitute the vital party in Christianity. Elsewhere he observes that mankind generally is inclined to false hypostatization and is really not capable of understanding that the value of things, especially of the arts and religion, is moral rather than material. Here he suggests that religion must claim literal validity in order to be, for the majority of men, a significant ethical and spiritual force. Christ, for example, is not a significant symbol for the average Christian without a literal interpretation of the account of the gospels. Only another world, independent and substantial, will enable the unimaginative man, or the man who does not know he has imagination, to transcend the world in which he labors and lives. Santayana recognized such literalness as the *sine qua non* of a vital religious faith on a certain level. Yet, he suggests, such a religion can never be truly spiritual; indeed, it has not escaped far enough from superstition or magic to quite deserve to be called religion. "Magic does not begin to be prayer until it leaves the issue in God's hands, and reconciles itself beforehand to a denial of the need or hope expressed."[24] The moral efficacy of prayer, which so few understand, rather than the material efficacy which the multitude demands, is thus rendered essential to the distinction between prayer, or truly spiritual expression, on the one hand, and magic or superstition on the other.

The ambivalent, though perhaps largely consistent, attitude towards the literal *versus* the symbolic acceptance of religious scriptures is also evident in Santayana's very latest writings, where his own views are perhaps clearer. Speaking of the implications of cosmography for Christianity, he wrote, "Heaven must be a spatial region, where material bodies may move about and encounter one another. Heaven, like hell, must be a part of the astronomical world. This was undoubtedly the primitive conception; but it is interesting to see that Christian faith is pledged to maintain it at any cost. If Christ arose not from the dead, as

[23] George Santayana, *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels*, p. 152.
[24] George Santayana, *Realms of Being*, p. 797.

Saint Paul tells us, our faith is vain, and we are the most miserable of men."[25] Here it is suggested that Saint Paul expresses exactly the faith of the average Christian. Yet Santayana also suggests that "the genuine inspiration of modern religion is moral, and drawn from the difficulties, hopes, and joys of the spirit. In this capacity, as expressing the inner life, it may be interesting; but it has absolutely no standing ground in external fact. . . ."[26] He reaffirms this with a different emphasis in another work: "On its spiritual side religion is not a false science but an ideal affection. It does not misrepresent the facts but transcends them."[27] This apparently is not intended as a denial of the spiritual and moral values of literal belief, or even of superstition and magical practices. For later he writes that "religious faith regards the good as a miraculously physical power, and if this belief is an illusion, the pious practices invoking that miraculous power are vain economically. Yet even they are not vain spiritually, because they quicken in us a clear view of the good attainable and a comprehensive sense of the volume and overwhelming splendour of things perhaps unattainable for the moment but profoundly congenial to the latent aspirations of our nature."[28] Santayana is committed to the seemingly contradictory view that religion is of the world but yet otherworldly, that it grows out of the predicaments in which the world involves both body and soul but is nonetheless alien to worldly interests and fortunes. Religion is the glitter which the refracted light of spirit throws off as it struggles for a measure of freedom in its inevitable bondage to the world and the flesh. Such glitter is precious, especially to the spirit, but offers no evidence of either things present or to come, though it is itself often mistaken for the ultimately real.

IV

Though one may disagree with Santayana in regard to the relation between poetry and religion, and be puzzled by the ambivalence he exhibits, it is nonetheless a *non sequitur* that religion is altogether sterilized or rendered insignificant by taking his hypothesis seriously. For, according to Santayana, man's happiness depends on the exercise of his poetic capacities, and it is through these that real spirituality is achieved. It is finally exceedingly practical that such capacities be used, since otherwise man's life is hardly better than that of the animals. To stultify man's poetic

[25] George Santayana, *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels*, p. 160.
[26] George Santayana, *Realms of Being*, p. 843.
[27] George Santayana, *Dominations and Powers*, p. 21.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

orientation to life makes his life mean, narrow, and plodding. There is, surely, nothing sterile or insignificant about prayer which expresses "poetically the troubles and longings of the soul, but in expressing them tends to transcend them, to accept defeat, to make a victory out of that acceptance, and to redeem itself by self-transformation." [29] One certainly may—and many do—demand more from religion: one may demand that religion not simply accept and transcend the world and transform the self, but that it reform the world and preserve the self as it is. However, there is at least some truth, I suspect, in Santayana's suggestion that such demands violate the religious ideals of piety and charity and arrest the development of spirituality, since these are not so much required in the reformation of the world and preservation of the self as are knowledge and power sufficient to manipulate the structures and processes of matter. It is not poetry or religion but physics that is needed to meet these demands; and such demands violate religious ideals, not because there is an essential incompatibility between the knowledge of physics and such ideals, but only because present limitations of man are such that the spirit seems to thrive best when it is content with less.

Religion, then, as Santayana understands it, is shot through and through with human ideals, fears, and needs. The "other world to live in," which is the essence of religion, has absolutely nothing to do with an actual life in a world beyond the present one; but it has a great deal to do with man's orientation and success within a world which he finds both alien and congenial to his needs and desires. But this "other world to live in" is not fanciful or arbitrary. For, "in living minds the idea of a world, as it is or as it should be, does not arise of its own accord but in behalf of needs and impulses already rooted in the animal soul." [30] In a very real and fundamental sense, according to Santayana, and "strange as it may sound to the rationalist who thinks prayer ridiculous, the only perfectly rational form of life for a spirit that has attained self knowledge is the life of prayer." [31]

Any religion which does justice to human nature must be permeated with poetry, with the poetry that is bred by the achievements, hopes, dreams, and frustrations of the human creature. There has been no great or enduring religion without such poetry, and unless human nature is impoverished to an inconceivable extent there can be no adequate religion without the conscious creation of poetic symbols. Indeed, the most primitive and empty

[29] George Santayana, *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels*, p. 128.
[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 200–201.
[31] George Santayana, *Realms of Being*, p. 801.

of man's religions are, in some measure, poetic and artistic expressions of hope, or an enhancement of an otherwise hateful existence. The crudest songs and rituals have a human beauty which redeems their baser elements. Santayana emphasized all this. Yet his appreciation of the poetry of religion does not seem to have been entirely as deep as it was broad. Indeed, there is much in Santayana to indicate that he saw best and appreciated most the surface significance of poetry and religion, and very little to suggest that the poetic fact may in some sense claim equal, and even superior, existential stature to the physical fact. It is regrettable that he was never profoundly influenced by the modern concern with myths and symbols, and their growing significance in the analysis of knowledge and communication, although both Peirce and Royce were greatly concerned with the import of symbolism while Santayana was still at Harvard. Of course, Santayana, too, was concerned with *symbol* and *myth,* but he used *symbol* and *myth* in the rather traditional superficial sense. He seemed to regard the religious and artistic situation, so far as myth and symbol are concerned, as strictly that of a dilemma: symbol and myth are either to be taken literally or they are to be considered important aesthetically and altogether irrelevant to the understanding of the nature of man and the universe. But the situation does not seem to be so simple actually. It is not true that one must accept the literal truth of religious and artistic myths and symbols in order to maintain that such myths and symbols are significant epistemologically, and even ontologically, as well as aesthetically and emotionally. Indeed, the symbols of science are not to be interpreted at all literally; yet surely no one would dare assert that as such they are entirely irrelevant to knowledge of the physical world. They are, indeed, the means to such knowledge. Likewise, myth and symbol in art and religion must, it seems, be conceived as means of expressing and communicating a dimension or area of human experience which so far has hardly been approached by the more systematic and formal enquiries of the sciences.

It is, indeed, surprising that Santayana, with his very keen sensitivity and wide experience, should not have perceived more sharply and elaborated more precisely the fundamental difference between poetry and art of the ilk that is concerned largely with the sensuous qualities of its own medium and the more profound sort (both within and without the religions) which professes to be seriously concerned with the problems of men. Surely the difference is not a matter of claims alone. There is a seriousness about the best of poetry, and practically all religions, that is not at all characteristic of poetry as an object of pure and detached aes-

thetic appreciation. Certainly there is a great deal in Santayana (too often ignored by his unfriendly critics) to suggest that he was not unaware of this seriousness and depth; yet he gave no really distinctive philosophic treatment to religion and poetry of this sort. Ambivalence again plagues the reader: art and religion grow out of the conditions of existence, and are in a sense "profoundly just"; yet so far as the knowledge of the nature of things is concerned they are profoundly useless. This does not seem at all fair to the artistic and religious traditions and endeavors. Man finds himself on this whirling sphere, suspended in the midst of suns and planets whose number alone surpasses the greatest stretch of his imagination. With some surprise, if he reflects upon it, he finds himself intensely aware of the beauty and ugliness that surround him, the heir of magnificent human efforts to pierce the mystery, but nonetheless essentially ignorant and greatly concerned about his nature and destiny. Neither science nor art nor religion can give complete assurance in these matters. Yet, in some measure, whatever seems comforting, meaningful, or intelligible must somehow be counted as indicative of the nature of man and the universe. Art and religion have been *all these* in human experience. Indeed, Santayana's own philosophy must finally be counted as one of the wonders which indicates the rich complexity of a universe which cherishes equally the many faces (apparently contradictory) she shows to her creatures.

No one, I think, has appreciated more than Santayana the vistas and values possible to the human spirit in its various expressions. Yet many critics have insisted that almost no one has attached less significance—as far as the fundamental nature of the universe is concerned—to the existence of spirit and its celebration in art and religion. In a sense this accusation seems quite just, and the exposition here has not so far adequately indicated otherwise. Spirit redeems life from vanity, but only momentarily, before it is swallowed again into the dark fertility of matter whence it came. The "phases of human progress"—the development of spirit—are episodic, and doomed, apparently, to eventual and perhaps final extinction. Paradoxical as it may seem to human aspiration and endeavor, the highest values (according to the critics' interpretation of Santayana) are finally the least significant because they are phenomenal and ephemeral.

This, however, is really quite unfair to Santayana. For finally he emphasized, too, the "aspect of eternity" which has given solace to so many disillusioned idealists. Seen under the form of eternity the intrinsic worth of every experience appears and is known and valued for what it is. Temporal considerations are

then irrelevant. Weighed in the scale of eternity, Santayana suggests, spiritual values always greatly overbalance all others, not in endurance, but in intrinsic and qualitative merit. And really there does not seem to be a more appropriate and certain justification of the spirit and the spiritual life. This was all, I think, that Socrates, Aristotle, and Spinoza could ever really find, though they were never so thoroughly disillusioned as Santayana.

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PROFESSOR STEVENSON, VOLTAIRE, AND THE CASE OF ADMIRAL BYNG

I

IN one of the later and less discussed chapters of *Ethics and Language*,[1] Professor Stevenson offers a plausible explanation of our normal practice of withholding moral judgments in cases of unavoidable actions. He maintains that the reason why we do not normally make moral judgments in such cases is that they will not be effective in controlling anyone's future conduct, either the agent's or our audience's or our own. Stevenson recognizes that we sometimes do pronounce judgments on unavoidable actions; but in these instances the judgments, he says, are merely impulsive; they "do no more than symptomize the speaker's blind emotions."[2] Moreover, Stevenson regards these instances as "relatively infrequent"[3]; he thinks that habit restricts most people most of the time to making moral judgments only when there is a possibility of their being useful in the control of someone's future conduct.

Although this is a plausible theory, I do not think that it is a correct one; and while I don't have any argument that will knock down Stevenson's position, I think that I can set it tottering. Stevenson's conception of the function of ethical discourse (which he has done so much to illuminate) is in important respects defective; and I think that the present topic reveals a major point of inadequacy more clearly than any other.

To illustrate the ineffectiveness of making moral judgments of unavoidable actions (and likewise of unavoidable failures to act), Stevenson invites us to consider the case of an army officer who has failed to win an engagement. If the officer's failure was avoidable, then, Stevenson holds, his commander can expect to achieve

[1] Chap. XIV (pp. 298–318): "Avoidability; Indeterminism."
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 308.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 308.

something by censuring him. For the commander's "judgment of the officer's past failure will make the officer ashamed of himself, and induce him to modify his choice in any roughly similar case that may arise. To generalize: a judgment of an avoidable act is likely to control actions of the kind judged."[4]

If the failure was unavoidable, however, "the officer having been confronted with overwhelming odds," then "an ethical judgment will *not* serve to prevent subsequent failure."[5] A wise commander will refrain from judgment, since judgment would not help control the future actions either of the defeated officer or of other subordinates. "The precedent established by judging an *un*avoidable act would carry over, for the most part, to *other* unavoidable acts. It would be an *ineffective* warning to the rest of his officers, terrifying them about matters which they were powerless to control."[6] If the defeated officer keeps his head in the face of such a rebuke, and does not let indignation sway him, the humiliation that he has suffered "would scarcely lead him to resign his commission; for knowing that the failure was unavoidable, he would have little or no reason to suppose that his successor could do better in preventing failures, and so would find resignation pointless."[7]

The naïveté of this last remark is rather touching. Stevenson clearly thinks better of his fellow men, including his hypothetical commander, than they ordinarily deserve. If the junior officer has no reason to expect that the commander will reform and in the future pronounce moral judgments only on Stevensonian principles, would it not be prudent for him to resign now, or get himself transferred, before by some bad chance he has another unavoidable failure and suffers worse disgrace?

Even if there are visible signs that the commander will henceforth refrain from judgment in cases where pronouncing judgments would be ineffective in controlling anyone's future conduct —which would be one way of living up to Stevensonian standards —it does not follow that the junior officer has no reason to dread his commander's judgment of some further unavoidable failure. For is it not mere unconsidered moral optimism to suppose, as Stevenson does, that unjust judgments are ineffective ones? A shrewd and unscrupulous commander might follow a deliberate policy of rebuking and punishing his subordinates for *all* failures, avoidable or not.

[4] P. 303.
[5] P. 304.
[6] P. 306.
[7] P. 306.

We may recall the case of Admiral Byng, about which Voltaire was so generously excited two hundred years ago. Byng had commanded the British fleet in an engagement with the French off Minorca in the year 1756; and, though he had not been defeated, he had not, in the opinion of the English public and his superiors, kept up the fight long enough, and the French fleet had therefore escaped. Byng was brought home and court-martialed; for "failing to do his utmost against the enemy," condemned to death; and shot, in spite of the pleas of many persons, among them the Duc de Richelieu, who had commanded the French army on Minorca and who was persuaded to intervene by the initiative of Voltaire. There is an ironic description of Byng's execution in Chapter 23 of *Candide*, which includes the famous line, "Dans ce pays-ci il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres."[8]

The motives of Byng's judges, and of the King, who refused him pardon, were no doubt very complicated. But it does not seem in the least fantastic to suggest that among them was the thought that this savage punishment would cause other commanders to redouble their efforts to avoid failures. In other words, Voltaire's comment may not have been merely ironical; it may have been (even if only inadvertently) descriptive. And the policy described may have had definite chances of success. Is it not very possible that a man will strive harder to avoid failure if he knows that no excuse will be accepted for not succeeding?

Another instance of former British naval justice, slightly earlier than the case of Byng, suggests even more clearly that a policy of accepting no excuses for failures was sometimes practiced specifically in regard to unavoidable actions. In 1745 the Royal Navy had made an example of Baker Philipps, a young officer who had been so unlucky as to be left in command of a defeated ship. Philipps had been second lieutenant in the 44-gun ship *Anglesea*. On patrol the 29th of March, 1744, an approaching ship was sighted; the captain of the *Anglesea* judged that it was English and went below to dine. He was wrong. The ship was not English, it was French—the 60-gun *Apollon*—and it came up and poured a broadside into the *Anglesea* from a distance of less than a hundred yards. Surprised, and badly damaged, the *Anglesea* could not return an effective fire of its own. The *Apollon* fired a second crushing broadside, which killed the captain and the master of the *Anglesea*. Since the first lieutenant had been left ashore sick, Philipps was now in command; and seeing that further defense of the ship was hopeless, he surrendered it.

[8] A thorough account of Byng's misfortunes is given in Julian S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Years' War*, London, 1907, Vol. I, Chap. V.

When he returned to England in an exchange of prisoners, Philipps was very harshly dealt with; he was court-martialed and executed for "neglect of duty." It was generally felt that he had been done an injustice; but the admirals may have thought that his disgrace and death would be a salutary lesson to other junior officers notwithstanding.[9]

I agree with Stevenson that an adverse ethical judgment addressed to the man whose action is judged is a sort of punishment, and may have the preventive and reformative uses of other sorts of punishment.[10] But it is at least possible that other sorts of punishment, even the most drastic, are effective in controlling future conduct when they are imposed for unavoidable actions; and I think it is also possible that adverse ethical judgments might be effective in the same circumstances: conceivably, they might be made deliberately, "pour encourager les autres."

Capital punishment, inflicted for an unavoidable action, may well seem so outrageous a penalty that most people would perhaps be reluctant to admit that it could be anything but self-defeating. Certainly one can readily imagine situations in which it would not stimulate officers to be more efficient and aggressive, or result in fewer ships surrendered, but instead so demoralize an officer corps as to incapacitate it for action of any kind. However, there are other situations in which the general intimidation and demoralization of subordinates may be precisely the effect wanted by the authorities; there are, after all, despotic societies as well as democratic ones. If we consider the amazing adaptability that human beings have demonstrated in such intensely despotic societies as those temporarily established in concentration camps, or the success obtained by the rulers of the Soviet Union with a system of punishment that evidently few men escape once they are accused of a lapse, however substantial their excuse, we shall not, I think, find the question of effectiveness so obvious, even for the most drastic punishments. I am not arguing that people are made happier or society more harmonious by inflicting drastic punishments for unavoidable actions; I am merely suggesting that there may be circumstances in which such punishments will successfully reduce the frequency of acts that

[9] Philipps' case is referred to in the *Britannica* article on Byng; for a succinct account of it see the article on Philipps in *The Dictionary of National Biography*.

[10] Stevenson, *op. cit.*, p. 307. Moral judgments like other punishments may be *just* or *unjust*. The phrase, "an adverse ethical judgment addressed to the man whose action is judged," might serve as a definition of a "reprimand," which is clearly, and in the United States Army even officially, a variety of punishment. (Of course we can blame people or disapprove of their actions without *telling* anyone; and judgments that we make but keep to ourselves are not punishments.)

are not wanted by the policy-makers and increase the frequency of acts that are wanted.[11]

Whether or not drastic punishments would be effective in controlling future conduct if they are imposed for unavoidable actions, milder punishments might be; and this possibility suffices for my argument. It is fairly standard practice in the Army to allow no excuses at all for minor putative lapses: late returning from pass; absence from formation; dirty equipment; etc. Of course, men are not shot for these things; though they used to be beaten. Working on similar principles, a Dean of Women who accepted no excuses from girls who failed to return to their dormitory by midnight might have many fewer cases of lateness to deal with than a more tolerant and popular person.

In the use of any system of rewards and punishments, we may suppose that the social authorities wish to encourage certain kinds of conduct and to discourage certain other kinds. Now, they may choose to punish all actions of a given sort, whether or not the action was in any particular case avoidable.[12] For instance, they may cause to be punished all cases of one man's being on another's property without the owner's explicit previous permission. Such a policy may have variable effects upon the frequency of trespass; upon respect shown for private property in other connections; upon general law-abidingness. Is it not a real question whether this policy, which might be said to risk injustice with the hope of reducing crime, would be less effective in encouraging the sort of conduct the authorities wished to encourage than an alternative policy, which perhaps risked crime in order to reduce injustice?

Of course it is a real question; and it is an empirical question, which I cannot pretend to decide *a priori*. Stevenson's position involves a number of empirical questions that neither he nor I can settle without producing a great deal of carefully elaborated factual evidence. Where is Stevenson's evidence? As far as I can see, he

[11] A society may be politically stable and economically productive without being either happy or harmonious. It has sometimes been said of the Soviet system, which persists in spite of frequent changes in its administrative elite, that in contrast to comfortable bourgeois societies it offers more people a chance to exercise power, though it denies them any security of tenure; while in bourgeois societies, promotion is slower, and most capable people never rise above relatively very subordinate jobs. Systematic insecurity in the jobs just below the highest has for the rulers of the Soviet Union the special advantage of preventing the formation of a continuous organized opposition. On this point, *cf.* Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York, 1951, pp. 408–409.

[12] I am assuming that the action can be described as belonging to a sort of action that is sometimes avoidable and sometimes not. See below, Section III.

has not collected any; and therefore his confidence that he has solved the problem why we do not normally make moral judgments of unavoidable actions is, I think, premature.

II

I shall now try to show more formally how very doubtful Stevenson's solution is, by spelling out the possibilities that he ignores.

Stevenson seems to hold both (*A*) that moral judgments of unavoidable actions are ineffective in controlling anyone's future conduct and (*B*) that (generally speaking) people believe that they are ineffective.[13] I shall treat these two propositions separately, as different candidates for the role of general explanation.

A. Let us first ask whether the proposition that moral judgments of unavoidable actions are ineffective in controlling anyone's future conduct can be a general explanation of the fact[14] that people do not normally (that is, except from impulsiveness or anger or vindictiveness[15]) make such judgments. It seems very doubtful that it can be; for it seems possible (I should say, even likely) that there are cases of unavoidable actions in which moral judgments would *not* be ineffective in controlling future conduct. In such a case, if the judgment is withheld (and I continue to suppose that often it *would* be withheld), one cannot explain the withholding by saying that pronouncing the judgment would be ineffective; for this would be untrue.

Possibly cases of this kind, even if they do occur, are rare; and possibly even when they are added to the cases of unavoidable actions upon which moral judgments are made from mere impulse, a great majority of cases will remain in which there is a coincidence between refraining from judgment and a prospect of ineffectiveness. All the same, the explanation from ineffectiveness will obviously be unsatisfactory if *any* cases can be found of the sort I have in mind; for a quite different explanation will have to be offered for the withholding of moral judgment in these cases.

Whether there are such cases, and whether they are comparatively rare, or, on the contrary, rather frequent, are questions that only competent research in social psychology could settle.[16] It is natural, perhaps, to believe either that there are not such cases, or that, if there are, the effectiveness in them of moral judgments or

[13] Stevenson, *op. cit.*, pp. 304 and 306.

[14] Assuming that it is a fact, which I do not wish to bring into question.

[15] These are the exceptions to normality mentioned by Stevenson.

[16] A cursory look through an assortment of psychological textbooks and journals has failed to uncover any evidence that the question has been settled before now. It doesn't even seem to have been raised.

of other kinds of punishment is always a temporary phenomenon only, which is canceled out in the long run; for such beliefs reinforce one's faith that (at least in the long run) justice is more attractive than injustice in every way, and, among other things, more practical. I share this faith with Stevenson; but I don't think that recourse to it would be a very impressive way of disposing of the present issue.[17]

B. Let us next ask whether the proposition that people *believe* that moral judgments of unavoidable actions are ineffective in controlling anyone's future conduct can be a general explanation of the fact that people do not normally make such judgments. This proposition is of course not open to the same doubts that we have raised concerning the previous one. For people might *believe* that moral judgments would be ineffective even on occasions when they would in fact not be.

But again, the proposition, while it is not clearly false, is certainly very doubtful. If there were (as there may be) any cases in which though the actions discussed were unavoidable, nevertheless moral judgments upon them would be effective in controlling someone's future conduct, it would surely be a very remarkable and astonishing thing that in all such cases, the people in a position to make moral judgments should make the mistake of thinking that such judgments would be ineffective. But if there are any cases in which people do not make this mistake, and yet refrain from pronouncing moral judgments upon the action discussed, some quite different explanation from the proposition offered will have to be invented for them.

The fact that it is far from obvious whether or not moral judgment of an unavoidable action will be totally ineffective in controlling anyone's future conduct seems a strong argument against attributing the belief that it *will* be ineffective to "a kind of commonsense wisdom."[18] Even if such a belief were quite widespread, it might not be the factor that restrained people from judging unavoidable actions morally; for it would, I suspect, be an extraordinarily sophisticated practice even to consider the prospects of effectiveness before pronouncing judgment, let alone consider only that.[19]

[17] Even if research into the punishment of unavoidable actions did disclose that all sorts of punishment, including mere censure, were ineffective in such cases, that would be a discovery which would have to be interpreted cautiously. For it might be that punishment in such cases was ineffective because it was especially resented; and it might well be that it was especially resented because people were attached to a certain conception of *justice*.

[18] Stevenson, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

[19] We reproach people for censuring others in cases of unavoidable actions. Are not the most typical reproaches of this sort: "It's unfair to

What the actual situation is, in contrast to these speculative possibilities, is (once again) for competent research in social psychology to discover.

III

I have ascribed to Stevenson the proposition that moral judgments of unavoidable actions are ineffective in controlling anyone's future conduct; and I think the phrase "anyone's future conduct" is required to take in the full scope of Stevenson's apparent intentions. But there is another way of expressing Stevenson's main point, which is actually closer to Stevenson's own wording, and which can be interpreted (with only a little twisting) as tautologously true.

Stevenson says, "Our main purpose in judging an action is to control it, or to control a future one that is like it." But "a judgment of an unavoidable act will not control actions of the kind judged." Therefore "a judgment of an *un*avoidable act will *fail* to serve its main purpose."[20] Now, if the view is taken that only other unavoidable actions can be of the *same kind* as a given unavoidable action, then the proposition, "Moral judgments of an unavoidable action will not be effective in controlling actions of the kind judged," may seem to be tautologously true. For "unavoidable" and "uncontrollable" may seem to be synonymous.

However, if we are to use this apparent tautology in an attempt to state Stevenson's position, we shall have to twist it about a little. For Stevenson does not discuss acts that are unavoidable by *anyone*, agent, or judge, or spectator; he is concerned exclusively with actions that the *agent* cannot avoid by an alternative choice.[21] Stevenson's position is less general than the apparent tautology just stated. But if we limit the meaning of "control" to measures that operate upon any agent's choice, leading him to avoid those acts that are both avoidable and unwanted and to do those acts that are both wanted and omissible, simultaneously keeping up the view that only other unavoidable actions can be of the same kind as a given unavoidable action, then we have, in the same words, a tautology that is not too general to fit Stevenson's position: "Moral judgments of an unavoidable action will not be effective in controlling actions of the kind judged."

I rather think that Stevenson does not mean at all to invoke any

blame him for that" or "He doesn't deserve the blame" or "You are being unjust" or "That is an unjust judgment"?

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 304.

[21] It might be, for example, that *we* could see to it that an action was avoided even when the prospective agent could not, perhaps through our having an exclusive power of promulgating laws.

tautology of this kind in constructing his position; but I have spent this time upon it, because I think that awareness of such truisms within easy reach may have played a part, together with the unthinking moral optimism already mentioned, in establishing Stevenson's remarkably unqualified confidence in his position. The position would not, of course, be improved by incorporating the tautology. Even if it is (in the sense described) undeniably true that moral judgments of an unavoidable action will not be effective in controlling actions of the kind judged, it remains entirely possible that they would be effective in controlling *other* actions—actions, for example, that are *somewhat* like the unavoidable one (as any instance of trespass might be like an unavoidable incursion upon someone else's property; or giving the ship up in any circumstances like unavoidably surrendering it); or actions that are not at all like the unavoidable one, but which are somehow related to it. That there is no effectiveness with regard to actions of these other kinds remains to be established; and why it should normally be disregarded, if it does exist, remains to be explained.

IV

My arguments on this apparently small and specialized topic do not reach the main body of Stevenson's doctrine; nor are they intended to. Stevenson teaches that the locutions of ethical discourse have only two properties generally in common: they are instruments for controlling future conduct; and they are simultaneously outlets for feelings or attitudes. I think this a useful and correct doctrine so far as it goes. But it is a doctrine that is easily distorted by prejudices (in other connections very laudable) that like Stevenson's favor calm and reasonable detachment in the practice of ethics; for this doctrine combined with these prejudices may easily lead to the position, to which they lead Stevenson, that the only rational consideration governing the use of ethical judgments is their efficiency in controlling future conduct. The offense that limitation to this consideration alone would give to our sense of justice fails to force itself upon Stevenson's attention because the same prejudices lead him to assume a world and society in which, apart from occasional lapses into "blind emotion," men can usually be counted upon to make ethical judgments calmly and reasonably, avoiding the resentments and reproaches of injustice if they can; a world, moreover, in which men never react to judgments that are unjust because they imply responsibility for unavoidable actions by conforming their future conduct more closely to the desires of their judges.

Let us call ethical judgments of actions that are not themselves

instances of making ethical judgments "normative"; and ethical judgments of actions that *are* instances of making ethical judgments "bi-normative." [22] Stevenson explicitly disavows, in *Ethics and Language,* any pretensions to "*judging* ethical methods" himself,[23] and this is a perfectly proper restriction to impose on his work. But the conventions that govern normative judgments do fall within Stevenson's chosen subject-matter; and these cannot be accurately described if the role of bi-normative judgments in their formation is disregarded. Efficiency is not the only consideration in the use of ethical judgments, any more than it is the only consideration in our use of rewards and punishments generally. It is subordinate in the practice of conscientious judges to bi-normative considerations; and just as we shall not (as I think) understand what reasons lead men to withhold ethical judgments in cases of unavoidable actions, so we may expect that our conception of the nature and functioning of ethical discourse will not be adequate, until we have looked into the bi-normative consideration of *justice.*

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[22] This is a different distinction from the one usually made by use of the expression "meta-ethical."

[23] *Vide, e.g.,* p. 308.

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NOTES AND NEWS

In commemoration of the centennial of Josiah Royce's birth, the Johns Hopkins Library is gathering into a small collection its memorabilia of the first Ph.D. in Philosophy of the Johns Hopkins University. The Library already has the manuscript of Royce's doctoral dissertation and a few letters. Persons who possess Royce autographs in the form of letters, comments on student papers, or articles, and who are willing to contribute them to the collection, are assured that they will be most gratefully received. Reprints also will be welcomed. It is hoped that such a collection will help any future historian of philosophy in America who is interested in the growth of a philosopher's mind.

The New Mexico Philosophical Society held its Summer Institute of Philosophy at the Harwood Foundation, Taos, New Mexico, August 11–12, 1956. The papers read, which constituted a colloquium in aesthetics, were as follows:

Yves Simon, "Love and Beauty."
John P. Anton, "The Question of Artistic Greatness."
Archie J. Bahm, "Buddhist Aesthetics."
Cecil Miller, "A Simple Definition of Beauty."
H. G. Alexander, "Art—Its Nature and Value."

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